Revista Brasileira de Alcino Eduardo Bonella ISSN 2358-8284

Filosofia da Religião Associação Brasileira de

Filosofia da Religião ABFR

Dossiê Fenomenologia e Filosofia Analítica da Religião

Divine Command Theory and Metaethics1

Teologia, Religião e Filosofia da Religião -

Teoria do Mandamento Divino e Metaética

Algumas Distinções a partir de uma Crítica
a Richard Dawkins
Agnaldo C. Portugal

ALCINO EDUARDO BONELLA(*)

A filosofia hebraica de Franz Rosenzweig
Maria Cristina Mariante Guarnieri

El ego amans

Abstract
Entre giro teológico y filosofía de la religión
Germán Vargas Guillén

I will
Uma saída do dilema outline an application of metaethics to the debate
de Eutífron

about Euthyphro’s dilemma and divine command theory

Nick Zangwill

(DCT). Metaethics elucidates how we should understand

É possível discutir ética a partir de
Temor e Tremor? Possíveis objeções a teses

.
kierkegaardianas e seus desdobramentos
Marcio Gimenes de Paula

I
depend on God’s approval/command. This is so because
moral objectivity does not depend on any approval and
command, what I try to show by the nature and the lo-
ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE FILOSOFIA DA RELIGIÃO - ABFR

/ good, bad, right,

wrong, ought to etc.). Other aspects related to DCT and
.
Keywords: Metaethics. Moral Objectivity. Divine
Command Theory. Subjectivism.

Resumo
E
dilema de Eutífron e teoria do mandamento divino. A me-

.A -
-
.I -

conceitos normativos/avaliativos (como bom, mal, certo,

Professor na Universidade Federal
(*)
erado, deve-se . .
de Uberlândia (UFU), onde ensina e
-
pesquisa ética e ética aplicada.
Atua nas áreas de: metaética, batidos.
. Palavras-chaves: Metaética. Objetividade Moral. Teoria
Pesquisa: racionalidade, do Mandamento Divino. Subjetivismo.
normatividade e valor da vida.
E-mail: .

1
An initial version of this paper was discussed in the Seminar on Natural Theology and Existence of God,
Brasilia, UnB, 2015. I .A N B - B
.I N B S
S B . N
FAPEMIG].

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 ivine o and eor and e ae ics

Divine command theory (DCT) is an obvious option for theists in ethics and phi-
.
required, prohibited or permitted to do, for most moral philosophers DCT holds that an
/ / . -
Euthyphro’s dilemma, a dilemma Plato poses in the
Euthyphro. There, S E
That is the same we can
S - 2015 67

S - 2015 67 . Argument from Euthyphro’s dilem-

ma 2015 6

1 E
commands.
2 I
.
3 I
-
Command Theory.
4) Therefore, or God is imperfect, or the Divine Command Theory is false.
5) God is not imperfect.
6) Therefore, the Divine Command Theory is false.”

S -
/
foundations. Call this a dependence thesis, the natural position of theists before the Eu-
thyphro’s dilemma Argument.
foundation for morality, but if theism is true, we have. For them objective moral values,
objective moral duties, and objective moral accountability depend on divine approval/
. 200 30-31 168-176 . Argument from Theism:

1 I .
2 .
3) Therefore, objective morality is not illusory.

S
.S - 2004 75 140 . I

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 Alcino Eduardo Bonella

. Argument from Atheism:

1 .
2 .
3) Therefore, morality is not objective.

/
. .
hand, skeptics and atheists take many laws as objective, even they have not an author or
. .S

objective. For the other hand, if morality is not an independent standard for the subject’s
approval (I mean, for his particular will and command), there would not be clear reason

- .
-
pletely free from any moral standard, the divine morality is only a matter of power, and
.
A 1 1 Discourse on Metaphysics:

.
2003 51-52

/
objective morality needs approval/command from someone. But moral objectivity does
.
.A .
.A
-
.

would not be like arbitrary desires. Moral truth would be a kind of rational truth (se for
2003 . 41 .

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 ivine o and eor and e ae ics

-
. -

moral truths mean. I assume here that such metaethical theses can be applied to the debate
.

- . 1 -
.
. 2 . -
- . 3

. - N
supervenience (S) of moral properties.

A N .
S. A S -
.A -
S. -
S impossi-
ble moral worlds .I .B
is approved by the subject makes it possible. Then, it is a bad theory. (see Bonella 2016).
Since subjectivism is a bad metaethical theory, DCT is also a bad theory, because, taken

completely dependent on the attitudes and beliefs of a particular subject/observer, God.2

S
make the content of moral beliefs necessarily relative to the opinions and approvals of
the individuals (subjects) who possess them. In Subjectivism, when a subject S states
.I
for this subject. I
. I
-
2
-
2005 . 54-55

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 Alcino Eduardo Bonella

tion. Both nihilism (there are not moral truths) and subjectivism (moral truths depend on
subjective approbation) share the denial that there are objective moral truths, truths that
are independent of individual subjective opinions.

2005 . 48

.A
that “X is morally acceptable” means “I (the speaker) approve X”, “X is morally unaccep-
I 2013 . 34 . I

S A

A S S A .

A S S A .

A S S A 200
. 172 .3

In metaethical subjectivism, a possible world, with the same natural properties as

the approval or disapproval by the subjects present in these worlds. Even inside a unique
.
One action, in the future, with the same natural properties as now, or in the past, could

.N
national leaders), may be, if subjectivism is true, morally approved/disapproved in dif-
ferent ways, via particular decisions, which do not depend on descriptive properties of
.S
S.
1 .

.B .S
.S good na-
Euthyphro dilemma.

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 ivine o and eor and e ae ics

Compare with rationalist objectivism: good -

. good a situation 1, and bad a situation 2, if 1 and 2 have the

same non-evaluative or descriptive features: it would be like to call red
and after call yellow
. red or good, and they could
2 bad (or the action 2 is wrong), and the
situation 1 is good (the action 1 is right
. S .

Since evaluative/normative concepts/words (good, right, bad, wrong etc.) superve-

S
-
.S 1 7 1 .
-
. -

.A
-

etc.) is an objective moral prescription. The reason instantiated in this objective prescrip-
tion lies in the facts-cum- .

This rationalist conception of moral truth is part of ethical objectivism, and moral
-
. begging question

objectively there, independent of your opinions and God’s opinions. Then, nihilism is not
the unique option if we do not believe in God and have no divine commands. On the same

Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião / Brasília / v.2 n.2 / p 162-172 / dez. 2015 / ISSN 2352-8284 167
 Alcino Eduardo Bonella

S .I
S -
nd necessary moral truths, and that such are independent reasons we can discover from
.
S 200 . 151-155 156-157 .

.
contra pro humanitarian leaders, and all this renders
.

-
. 2005 . 645

for objective morality and for the content of morality (that has been stablished by divine
.

B . .A
S B
.I .
-
.I
Euthyphro’s dilemma -
.B
.
- . 2005 . 645-647 .

. I good means (analytically) “what is

-
both conceptions are reductionists and are subjectivists - , then, a same action could be
-
are the same. This is a kind of logical arbitrariness. The morality of the action would be
in the subject’s will, not in the objective facts itself, or in the objective facts-cum-

Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião / Brasília / v.2 n.2 / p 162-172 / dez. 2015 / ISSN 2352-8284 168
 ivine o and eor and e ae ics

.
. Eu-
thyphro dilemma / .

.
E .
/ .I

non-subjectivist sense. If there are not reasons, DCT in its pure form is true but with, at
. .4

morally -

will or a character (nature) as morally .

- -
ral facts plus
. .E -
-
4
-
.
plausible interpretation of the Bible), or to command that wives should be submissive to their husbands (as
S B .
submissive to their owners is more than problematic, in my view, but seems to follow the same plausible
B I S I .
I I
What if He were to command etc., to test its metaehical implica-
.B -
Euthyphro’s dilemma: were God to ask some immoral
. -

.I -
B .S immoral-acts- for-us .

2005 57 .
B
.
B . N

.I
.
ethics, Euthyphro’s Dilemma B 2007.

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 Alcino Eduardo Bonella

.
Therefore, if someone, even God, morally approvals/commands an action, then there will
necessarily facts-cum- plus pres-
.

-
-
-
independence thesis for Euthyphro’s dilemma.
(so the name rationalist
and DCT merely states that if we accepts God’s commands or consult God’s commands,
. -
. -

of God.5 /
them, it adopts a voluntarist (subjectivist) solution. In this case, the morality of the action
would essentially depend on the divine approval or commands, and God would establish
.I the dependence thesis,
and a pure DCT.

A -
2005 58

1 I
.

2
commands.

3 I
commands, then some moral facts are independent of God’s commands and attitudes.

4 I
independent of God’s commands and attitudes, then the divine command theory is false.

5) Therefore, the divine command theory is false”.

5
A . -
ist a loving God, but a loving
A
. A 1 81 1
(2015) and Smith (2015).

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 ivine o and eor and e ae ics

I -
.I

moral .I . -
se values are normatively independent and prior to commands and attitudes. As Adams

- . -

-
to obey.6 I
.
S
. -

. S 200 156-15 .
to Euthyphro’s dilemma
like a human father has moral limits for what he asks his children, God would have mo-
.S 157
.

If we believe in moral objectivity, then commands/approvals depend on normative/

. -
B
morally
plus the facts of circumstances constrain
. -
.S
.A
.I -
ral objectivity, then commands/approvals depend on normative/evaluative reasons, not
.
normative content of moral truths.

6
- S 2015.
also Smith 2015.

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 Alcino Eduardo Bonella

e erences

A A S . A E I E . Divine
Commands and Morality. 1 81.

.1 . Finite and Infinite Goods. N .

B NE A A. E. .I -
A I . Anais Principia. S . N 2016.

B IN . . A .I A IN . Um mundo sem Deus: ensaios sobre o

ateísmo. E 70 2007.

AI . . E AN . . Filosofia e Cosmovisão Cristã. S N 2005.

AI . . .I A IA . . IN N. . Is Goodness
without God Good Enough 200 .

A E . Objective Prescriptions. 1 .

______. Sorting Out Ethics. 1 7.

E E . Ethical Intuitionism. N 2005.

AN I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1785 . I AN I. Practical Philosophy:

The Cambridge Edition. 1 .

EIBNI . . 1686 . I EIBNI . . Discourse in Metaphy-

sics and other Essays. I 1 1.

A E S . The elements of moral Philosophy. N - 2003.

S A E - AN A . Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? N

Press, 2004.

______. The Fundamentals of Ethics. 2015

S I . . . 2015

S INB NE . I A IA . . IN
N. . Is Goodness without God Good Enough 200 .

AN I N. E . Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião,

v. 1 n. 1, 2014.
2015
A 2015

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