PONTOS QUE DEVEM SER ANALISADOS:

Os Dispute Board são meios alternativos de solução de conflitos que em regra precedem
a arbitragem. Essa sua natureza prévia à solução de disputa por meio da jurisdição arbitral
implica que suas decisões possuem natureza meramente contratual, necessitando da tutela
jurisdicional arbitral, a fim de garantir sua executividade. [Bunni, supra note 19, at 599.
Kendall, supra note 26, at 67]. Além disso, o próprio Regulamento da CAMAGRO já
reconhece a inexistência de natureza jurisdicional dos DBs. [Regulamento, art. 4].
No caso em tela, existe a presença de um Dispute Board, modelo Combined Dispute
Board, o qual prevê a possibilidade de apresentação de Aviso de Insatisfação, meio pelo
qual é possível impugnar, no prazo de 28 dias, a decisão exarada pelo comitê.
[Regulamento, art. 22]
À luz dessas considerações, as decisões emitidas pelo DB não impedem a proposição da
ação no juízo arbitral, uma vez que, na condição de medidas pré-arbitrais, representam
apenas um requerimento de natureza facultativa, não se demonstrando como exigíveis
plenamente. [Pryles, supra note 8, at 161]
Ainda sob esse viés, é fundamental ressaltar que a característica distintiva da jurisdição é
sua capacidade de proferir decisões finais e definitivas, títulos executivos, conferindo a
essas decisões uma estabilidade especial, conhecida como coisa julgada. Somente os atos
jurisdicionais têm o poder de adquirir essa estabilidade excepcional [Ribeiro e Rodrigues,
2015, p. 3-4; Dantas e Dantas, 2016, p. 3]
Assim, durante o transcurso do caso, a decisão n° 3 exarada pelo comitê em 21.09.2022
indeferiu o pedido de suspensão da obra, além de inadmitir o justo direito de adequação
de performance lignocelulósica do milho substituído. [Caso, p. 57]
Ocorre que a Requerente apresentou tempestivamente o seu Aviso de Insatisfação em
29.09.2022, ocorrendo, portanto, todos efeitos de direito assegurados no dispositivo do
Regulamento da CAMAGRO. [Caso, p. 59; Regulamento, art. 22]
Há de se mencionar que, ao pactuarem em contrato a formação de um Comitê de
Resolução de Disputas, as decisões proferidas pelo mesmo tem caráter de obrigação
contratual entre as partes, no entanto, a força vinculante nesse caso é apenas contratual,
em momento algum será removido de qualquer das partes que seja o direito de recorrer à
jurisdição, estatal ou arbitral [Ravagnani, Nakamura, Longa, 2019].
Em paralelo, outras federações, nacionais e internacionais, também entendem que as
decisões proferidas pelos DBs serão admissíveis em qualquer procedimento arbitral
subsequente, motivo pelo qual é cabível a reapreciação da matéria por esse juízo. [Dispute
Board Rules - CIArb, 2014, pp. 4 e 5; Regulamento para o Comitê de Prevenção e
Solução de Disputas do CAM-CCBC, 2019, p. 2-3]

I... O Dispute Board é um precedente arbitral não obrigatório

Conforme já demonstrado anteriormente, a natureza dos DBs os impede de formular
decisões vinculantes ao juízo arbitral. Logo, a suposta vinculação obtida pelas decisões
exaradas pelos comitês de resolução de disputa são meramente contratuais, traço
característico de sua condição pré-arbitral. [Ribeiro, XXX, P. 232; Ravindra Kumar
Verma v. M/s BPTP Ltd & Anr]
Como consequência, a propositura da ação por via arbitral independe do preenchimento
dessas condições avençadas contratualmente. Isto se deve ao fato de que, conforme a
jurisprudência internacional, a presença de procedimentos pré-arbitrais é apenas de
natureza diretória, não obrigatória. [Sikand Construction and Saraswati Construction
Company] [ICC Case No 11490 (n 23); Judgment (16 May 2011) (2011) 29 ASA Bull
643, 651 et seq (Swiss Federal Tribunal); Judgment of 15 March 1999, (2002) 20 ASA
Bull 373, 374 (Kassationsgericht Zürich)]
Nessa toada, o estabelecimento de condições pré-arbitrais, em específico os DBs,
estabelecem, no máximo, diretrizes gerais para análise do árbitro. Desta feita, as cláusulas
de procedimentos pré-arbitrais são incapazes de invalidar a decisão final e vinculante do
juízo arbitral. [Stacher (fn. 45), p. 116.; Fernandes, 2019, p.56]
I.. O Aviso de Insatisfação e Requerimento de Arbitragem são Time-bar Clauses

I.II. O Requerimento de Arbitragem é de natureza recomendatória.

Percebe-se que nos Dispute Boards, a presença de prazos para propositura de aviso de
insatisfação é bastante comum [REGULAMENTOS]. No entanto, ressalte-se que o
entendimento doutrinário a respeito desse tipo de cláusula afirma a sua natureza
recomendatória. [Nicholas Gould and Christina Lockwood, p. 19, 2020; Pre-Arbitration
Procedural Requirements ‘A Dismal Swamp’]

Sob o viés jurisprudencial, tem-se entendido que a presença de cláusulas que estabeleçam
prazos para procedimentos em contratos de alta complexidade, como os de engenharia,
têm natureza recomendatória. [Tenloc v Errill Properties (1987) 39 BLR 30, CA, C Croom
Johnson LJ.;Amec Civil Engineering Ltd v The Secretary of State for Transport]

Ademais, a presença de documento de notória irresignação da parte, no caso o Aviso de

Insatisfação, prolonga o prazo contratual avençado, preenchendo, portanto, os requisitos
procedimentais acordados.[Tenloc v Errill Properties (1987) 39 BLR 30, CA, C Croom
Johnson LJ.;Amec Civil Engineering Ltd v The Secretary of State for Transport.; Amec
Civil Engineering Ltd v The Secretary of State for Transport.; Bremer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Vanden Avenne Izegem PVBA]

I.III. O prazo contratual do Requerimento de Arbitragem fere o princípio do acesso

à justiça.

No ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, tal medida é incabível, já que quaisquer obrigações

oriundas deste instituto somente terão natureza meramente contratual. Inexistindo,
portanto, a restrição do acesso à jurisdição. [RAVAGNINI, NAKAMURA, LONGA,
2020, p. 8]
Nessa toada, o entendimento jurisprudencial brasileiro tornou-se pacificado ao
compreender que as decisões exaradas pelos especialistas da mesa podem ser revistas,
quer pelo poder judiciário ou arbitral. Logo, diferentemente do que ocorre com a
arbitragem, não há reserva de competência para julgamento do caso, tão somente uma
decisão de natureza contratual. [(AREsp n. 1.512.201, Ministro Francisco Falcão, DJe de
25/09/2020]

Logo, as decisões exaradas por Dispute Board não possuem vinculatividade entre as partes, à medida
que estas se utilizam deste como meio alternativo para solução de conflitos. Portanto, estão as partes
livres para solucionar disputas com ou sem a assistência dos DBs mesmo que contratado. [CIARB,
2014, p. 21]

**************

Unless allowed by law, neither party may challenge the decision of the DAB after it has become
final and binding. In the case where the decision has become final and binding and a party fails
to comply with the decision then the failure itself may be referred to arbitration. This process
will allow for the mechanics of an arbitral award to be applied to the DAB’s decision.

According to Sub-Clause 67.2, the notice of dissatisfaction must state that it is given under Sub-
Clause 67.2 and set out the matter in dispute and the reason (s) for dissatisfaction. The effect of
the giving of the notice of dissatisfaction is to establish the party's contractual right to take the
matter to arbitration under the arbitration clause in Sub-Clause 67.4. This follows from Sub-
Clause 67.2 which provides that ordinarily no arbitration in respect of a dispute may be
commenced unless such notice of dissatisfaction has been given. [Seppala, 1997, p. 5]

If either party is dissatisfied with the Board's decision, then either party, on or before the twenty-
eighth day after the day on which it received notice of such decision, may notify the other party
and (for information) the Engineer of its dissatisfaction. If the Board fails to give notice of its
decision on or before the eighty-fourth day after the day on which it received the reference,
then either party, on or before the twenty-eighth day after the day on which the said period of
84 days has expired, may notify the other party and (for information) the Engineer of its
dissatisfaction. In either event, such notice of dissatisfaction shall state that it is given under this
Sub-Clause, and set out the matter in dispute and the reason (s) for dissatisfaction. Subject to
Sub-Clauses 67.5 and 67.6, no arbitration in respect of such dispute may be commenced unless
such notice is given. [Seppala, 1997, p. 15]

Good faith obligation Article 246 (1) states, “The contract must be performed in accordance with
its contents, and in a manner consistent with the requirements of good faith.” So for example,
if an employer was made aware of the contractor’s intention to claim in such manner, the
employer could be seen as acting in bad faith if he later argues that the contractor did not meet
the contractual timeframe. Alternatively, a time bar provision may not be relied upon by an
employer in circumstances where he is in breach and was fully aware that his breach would
cause delay to the Project

It is often suggested that in civil code jurisdictions it can be possible to raise a successful
challenge to time bars under the mandatory laws of that country on the basis of the time bar
being contrary to the notion of good faith or some other similar legal principle. For example, it
has been suggested that a German court might interpret the Contractor’s duty to give notice not
as a condition precedent to give notice but an obligation (“obliegenheit”) of the Contractor. This
would mean that the Contractor does not lose the right to make a claim but that the Contractor
must prove that his claims are valid and are not affected by his failure to meet his notice
obligation in time.8 [FIDIC’s clause 20.1 –a civil law view, Mauro Rubino-Sammartano,
Construction Law International Volume 4 No 1 March 2009]

This requirement is often softened by a clause giving discretion to a Superintendent to award

time, even if the contractor has failed to comply with the time bar clause. In the 2002 case of
Peninsula Balmain v Abigroup Contractors, the NSW Court of Appeal found that under the
unamended AS2124 contract where Abigroup had not complied with the time bar clause, the
court granted the extension of time and noted that a Superintendent “is obliged to act honestly
and impartially in deciding whether to exercise this power.” That is provided the contract does
not provide otherwise. For example, the contract might remove the obligation of fairness, and
give the Superintendent the absolute discretion to award an extension of time (or not.)

In the ANZ bank case, the court said that a clause can still be a penalty even though there has
been no actual breach to bring it into effect. So how does that apply to time bars in construction
contracts? Well it has not been to date. However the reasoning goes that, with such a short
notification period – seven days – a contractor is very unlikely to be able to put together the
necessary information to justify the entitlement or even show that the delay is on the critical
path in time. Therefore it would be a penalty to enforce the strict condition precedent and deny
the contractor’s right to additional time and potential compensation. It would be unfair,
especially in circumstances where the actual loss caused by the alleged late notification would
be minor in nature, especially in contrast with the delay damages the contractor might become
liable for. In fact they may even be nil if the employer has caused the delay in any event.

No waiting period or other condition precedent required following notice of dissatisfaction.

International Center for ADR, Dispute Board Rules (October 2015) [Albert Bates, Jr. and R.
Zachary Torres-Fowler1 Pepper Hamilton LLP Philadelphia, PA, United States][ Dispute Boards:
A Different Approach to Dispute Resolution] > fazer lista e comparativo das federações

” Likewise, in ICC Interim Award 1615537 the arbitral tribunal agreed that the 42-day time period
for providing further particulars was not a condition precedente
É importante ressaltar que a vinculação das partes às decisões dos DABs – ou CDBs,
quando aplicável – possui natureza contratual, e não jurisdicional. Isso implica que, de
um lado, essas decisões podem ser revistas jurisdicionalmente e, de outro, que eventual
descumprimento não prescinde do acionamento do juízo estatal ou arbitral para fins de
dar executoriedade à decisão do comitê, tal como ocorreria com o descumprimento de
uma cláusula contratual escrita. [Ribeiro, XXX, P. 232]

A propositura da ação por via arbitral independe de preenchimento dos requisitos

procedimentais avençados no contrato. Isto se deve ao fato de que, conforme a
jurisprudência internacional, a presença de procedimentos pré-arbitrais são apenas de
natureza diretória, não obrigatória. [Sikand Construction and Saraswati Construction
Company] [ICC Case No 11490 (n 23); Judgment (16 May 2011) (2011) 29 ASA Bull
643, 651 et seq (Swiss Federal Tribunal); Judgment of 15 March 1999, (2002) 20 ASA
Bull 373, 374 (Kassationsgericht Zürich)]
However, the same High Court in Ravindra Kumar Verma v. M/s BPTP Ltd &
Anr., held that noncompliance with preconditions indicated in the arbitration agreement
does not exclude the parties from initiating arbitration proceedings since it can result in
substantial and grave prejudice to the party seeking to invoke arbitration.
Indian Courts have also given due consideration to the likelihood of success of the pre-
arbitration dispute resolution clauses to reach an amicable settlement. In Demerara
Distilleries Pvt Ltd v Demerara
Distillers, the Supreme Court of India held that the likelihood of success of the precondi
tions to arbitration must be considered especially in the cases where the pre -
conditions are
open ended and do not provide conclusive definite terms to measure the attempt of satis
fying the pre-conditions.
Subsequently, different High courts in the matters of Kunwar Narayan vs.
Ozone Overseas Pvt. Ltd. and Ors[9],
Siemens Limited vs. Jindal India Thermal Power Limited[10], Union of India vs. M/s
Baga Brothers[11], Sarvesh Security Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Managing Director,
DSIIDC[12], relied upon the judgement of Ravindra Kumar
(supra), and reiterated that the pre-Arbitral steps are directory in nature

Parties are obliged to attend the pre-arbitration mediation but the parties are free to
commence arbitration after the period has expired and they are not required to negotiate
during the entire pre-arbitration mediation period. [ashford]

Even if a negotiation, conciliation, or litigation requirement is characterized as a

mandatory condition precedent, this does not mean that the requirement must be satisfied
prior to initiation of arbitration. On this view, it is unduly formalistic to dismiss an
arbitration, requiring a party to commence or complete a contractual period for
negotiations, only to thereafter commence the same arbitral process. p. 250 [Pre-
Arbitration Procedural Requirements ‘A Dismal Swamp’]

Notwithstanding the general availability of interlocutory judicial resolution of

jurisdictional disputes under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in the United States, US
courts have generally refused to consider claims whether pre-arbitration procedural
requirements have been satisfied; instead, US courts have reasoned that disputes over
pre-arbitration procedural requirements are ordinarily for the arbitrators to decide.

See John Wiley & Sons, Inc v Livingston, 376 US 543 (US SCt 1964); Dialysis Access
Ctr, LLC v RMS Lifeline, Inc, 638 F3d 367, 383 (1st Cir 2011) (‘[T]he parties’
disagreement over whether RMS complied with the MSA’s alleged good faith
negotiations pre-requisite to arbitration is an issue for the arbitrator to resolve in this
case’); United Steelworkers of Am v St Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc, 2007 WL
2827583, para 1 (6th Cir) (‘Whether the parties have complied with the procedural
requirements for arbitrating the case, by contrast, is generally a question for the
arbitrator to decide’); Marie v Allied Home Mortg Corpn, 402 F3d 1, 9–11 (1st Cir
2005); PaineWebber, Inc v Elahi, 87 F3d 589 (1st Cir 1996); PaineWebber, Inc v
Bybyk, 81 F3d 1193, 1196 (2d Cir 1996); Del E Webb Constr v Richardson Hosp Auth,
823 F2d 145, 149 (5th Cir 1987); Belke v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc,
693 F2d 1023, 1027–8 (11th Cir 1982); PTA-FLA, Inc v ZTE USA, Inc, 2011 WL
4549280, para 5 (DSC)

Courts in jurisdictions other than the United States have also generally held that disputes
regarding compliance with pre-arbitration procedural requirements are for arbitral
tribunals’ determination See, eg, Société Nihon Plast v Société Takata-Petri (n 37)
(objection based on preliminary conciliation clause is not challenge to arbitral tribunal’s
jurisdiction but issue relating to admissibility of claim which cannot be reviewed by Cour
d’appel); Burlington N RR Co v Canadian Nat’l Railway [1997] 1 SCR

Sub-Clause 20.4 is clear that the decision given by the DAB is ‘binding’ on the parties –
but it is not yet final at this stage, but nevertheless is binding and must be adhered to
immediately or as stated in the decision itself. [Chern, 2015, p. 463]

There is no direct authority (either in English Law or otherwise) on the interpretation of

Clause 61.3 of NEC 3 or on Clause 20.1 of the FIDIC forms. However, the House of
Lords decision in Bremer v. Vanden Avenne [1978]16 is authority for the proposition that
for a notice requirement clause to rank as a condition precedent the clause must state the
precise time for service and make it plain by express language that unless the notice is
served within that time, the party required to give notice will lose its rights under that
clause.
However, there is a possibility that even in cases where a time-bar clause appears to be
drafted as a condition precedent that a court/arbitral panel may refuse to construe it as a
condition precedent. A notable example of this is the English Court of Appeal case of
Koch Hightex GmbH v. New Millennium Experience Company Ltd (1999)17 in which it
was held that the following express clause was not a condition precedent: ‘The provision
of a guarantee and performance bond is a condition precedent to any liability or obligation
of the New Millennium Company under the contract.

The so-called prevention principle provides that where one party [the contractor] to a
contract has failed to perform a condition of that contract [e.g. reach completion by the
completion date], the other party [the employer] cannot rely on its non-performance if it
was caused by his own wrongful act. [See Roberts v. The Bury Improvement
Commissioners (1870) LR 5 CP 310, Exchequer Chamber, per Blackburn and Mellor JJ,
at pp. 326: ‘. . . it is a principle very well established at common law that no person can
take advantage of the non-fulfilment of a condition the performance of which has been
hindered by himself . . .’

However, the Australian cases of Gaymark Investments Pty Ltd v. Walter Construction
Group Ltd (1999)23 and Peninsula Balamain Pty Ltd v. Abigroup Contractors Corp Pty
Ltd [2002]24 have held that the prevention principle defeats such time-bar clauses.

Turner Corporation Ltd v. Co-ordinated Industries Pty. 20 In Turner Justice (J) Cole,
addressed the direct conflict between the prevention principle and the condition precedent
clause, stating: ‘If the Builder having a right to claim an extension of time fails to do so,
it cannot claim that the act of prevention which would have entitled it to an extension . .
. resulted in its inability to complete by that time. A party to a contract cannot rely upon
preventing conduct of the other party where it failed to exercise a contractual right which
it would have negated the effect of that preventing conduct.’ City Inns Ltd v. Shepherd
Construction Ltd. 22 In City Inns a similarly a robust judicial view was taken of the
contractor’s obligation to comply with an express time-bar clause (heavily amended JCT
80 Private with Quantities). [The relevant part of clause 13.8 is 13.8.5 which stated: ‘If
the Contractor fails to comply with one or more of the provisions of Clause 13.8.1, where
the Architect has not dispensed with such compliance under 13.8.4, the Contractor shall
not be entitled to any extension of time under Clause 25.3.’]

De´cor Ceiling Pty Ltd v. Cox Constructions Pty Ltd (No 2). 21 In De´cor Ceiling the
Supreme Court of South Australia had to consider whether the sub-contractor’s claims
failed because a notice of claim required by clause 46 in the contract was not served by
De´cor. The relevant express clause 46 stated: The Main Contractor shall not be liable
upon any claim by the Subcontractor in respect of or arising out of a breach of the
Subcontract unless within 28 days after the first day upon which the Subcontractor could
reasonably have been aware of the breach, the Subcontractor has given to the Main
Contractor’s Representative the prescribed notice. The Main Contractor shall not be liable
upon any other claim by the Subcontractor for any extra cost or expense in respect of or
arising out of any direction or approval by the Main Contractor’s Representative unless
within 42 days of the entitlement to make the claim, the Subcontractor has given to the
Main Contractor’s Representative the prescribed notice

Peninsula Balamain Pty Ltd v. Abigroup Contractors Corp Pty Ltd. 24 In this case the
New South Wales Court of Appeal considered the following express time-bar clause:
‘The Principal shall not be liable upon any claim by the Contractor in respect of or arising
out of a breach of the Contract unless within 28 days after the first day upon which the
Contractor could reasonably have been aware of the breach, the Contractor has given to
the Superintendent the prescribed notice.’ Although the contractor failed to comply with
the notice requirements set out in the contract the Court of Appeal held that such failure
to give notice did not deprive the contractor of his right to an extension of time but merely
delayed it. The Court of Appeal held that the prevention principle trumped the time-bar
clause and that the Superintendent should have exercised his unilateral power to grant an
extension of time to cover the employer delay. [ The rise and rise of time-bar clauses]
Marie v Allied Home Mortg Corpn, 402 F3d 1, 9–11 (1st Cir 2005); PaineWebber, Inc
v Elahi, 87 F3d 589 (1st Cir 1996); PaineWebber, Inc v Bybyk, 81 F3d 1193, 1196 (2d
Cir 1996); Del E Webb Constr v Richardson Hosp Auth, 823 F2d 145, 149 (5th Cir 1987);
Belke v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 693 F2d 1023, 1027–8 (11th Cir
1982); PTA-FLA, Inc v ZTE USA, Inc, 2011 WL 4549280, para 5 (DSC) (whether
‘[d]efendant failed to satisfy a condition precedent to arbitration by failing to participate
in pre-arbitration proceedings in good faith is a matter for resolution by the arbitration
panel’) [swamp]

if non‐compliance with pre‐arbitral steps were treated as a breach of contract, the classic
legal remedy would be damages, the quantifying of which would be all but impossible
for the party sustaining the damage. Nathalie Voser, Sanktionen bei Nichterfüllung einer
Schlichtungsklausel, Note on a Decision, Zurich Court of Cassation, 15 March 1999, in
ASA Bulletin 2002, 376‐381; Brown‐Berset (fn. 12), 368 et seq.; Jarrosson (fn. 17), 755;
Jolles (fn. 6), 336.

Art. 23. Se, em previsão contratual de cláusula de mediação, as partes se comprometerem

a não iniciar procedimento arbitral ou processo judicial durante certo prazo ou até o
implemento de determinada condição, o árbitro ou o juiz suspenderá o curso da
arbitragem ou da ação pelo prazo previamente acordado ou até o implemento dessa
condição.
Parágrafo único. O disposto no caput não se aplica às medidas de urgência em que o
acesso ao Poder Judiciário seja necessário para evitar o perecimento de direito. (LEI DE
MEDIAÇÃO)
In the decision of 9 August 2016, the Bundesgerichtshof upheld the tribunal's decision to
assume jurisdiction although one party asserted that the parties had not tried to first settle
their dispute amicably as required by their MDR-clause. The court emphasized that non-
compliance of pre-arbitral tiers is not an issue of jurisdiction, but admissibility of the
claim. Decision BGH, NJW 2017, p. 490, c. II. 3.

. The purpose of pre-arbitral steps is not to attribute the dispute to a particular court or
arbitral tribunal, but to define under what conditions the parties may refer the matter to
the arbitrator. MDR-clauses thus have no bearing on the validity of an arbitration clause.
Opting for an MDR-clause which imposes pre-arbitral requirements presumably does not
change the fact that the parties intended for an arbitral tribunal to render a binding and
final decision on the matter. (Stacher (fn. 45), p. 116.)

Multi-tiered (or simply tiered) dispute resolution clauses provide a sequence of dispute
resolution methods, typically requiring parties to attempt alternative dispute resolution
before engaging in arbitration or court litigation. Each tier or step in the dispute process
is more formal and more costly than the previous tier. The first stage is often a meeting
of senior managers, the second stage is often mediation with the final stage, arbitration or
court. Tiered disputes clauses are common in contracts for large and complex projects,
such as construction or energy projects. [LONGLEY, CHRIS CHO, 2020, p. 2]
Multi-tiered dispute resolution clauses merge ADR and arbitration procedures and
provide for a sequence of dispute resolution processes generally composed of negotiation,
mediation, expert determination, and finally arbitration. By inserting a multi-tiered
dispute resolution clause in their contract, parties agree to resolve their potential
controversies by using these escalating steps with an intention that arbitral proceedings
will only be commenced in case of the failure of previous ADR techniques [ames H.
Carter, Issues Arising from Integrated Dispute Resolution Clauses, in New Horizons in
International Commercial Arbitration and Beyond, ICCA Congress Series No. 12, 446
(A.J. van den Berg ed., 2005~
Expert determination is another ADR method by which a third person ischosen by the
parties to decide an issue between them. Like arbitration, expert determination is a dispute
resolution system that resultsin a binding decision. However, there are two fundamental
differences between expert determination and arbitration. First, an arbitrator isimmune
from liability for negligence in performing his duties while an expert may be liable for
negligence. Second, an arbitral award is directly enforceable under the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards(“New York Convention”)
whereas an expert decision can only be enforced by proceedingsin the court if the parties
do not abide by it voluntarily. [John Kendall, Expert Determination 1 (2001). Redfern &
Hunter, supra note 16, at 50.]

As a special form of expert determination, dispute boards are created to operate

throughout the contractual relationship both to prevent disputes between the parties and
to settle them when they occur. They are increasingly being used in international
construction and engineering contracts by the parties [Bunni, supra note 19, at 599.
Kendall, supra note 26, at 67]
Therefore, these dispute resolution procedures are not enforceable under judicial
supervision [Pryles, supra note 8, at 161.]

The plaintiffs brought action for damagesrelying on the breach of the agreement of March
17, while the defendants argued that the agreement was unenforceable because of
uncertainty. The House of Lords held that the agreement of March 17 lacked certainty
and was unenforceable as a bare agreement to negotiate. In the course of the proceedings,
Lord Ackner stated that an agreement to negotiate, like an agreement to agree, was
unenforceable simply because it lacked the necessary certainty. (50) (51) [Walford v.
Miles]